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1
Remittances and Reputations in Hawala Money-
Transfer Systems:  Self-Enforcing Exchange on an
International Scale
Emily C. Schaeffer∗
George Mason University
Abstract
Migrant worker remittances often take place outside the scope of
government enforcement. Through an examination of the informal
remittance transfer system of hawala, this paper argues that self-enforcing
exchange mechanisms can support high volume trade in the absence of
formal contract enforcement. Hawala networks employ ex post reputation
mechanisms between agents and ex ante signaling to uphold obligations
under conditions of contract uncertainty.
JEL Codes: D85, F33, G29, N25, P48, Z13
Keywords: Hawala, Self-enforcement, Remittances, Networks
I. Introduction
Trade flourishes when individuals have confidence that other
members of society will honor and enforce obligations and promises.
In countries where the rule of law is the modus operandi, contract law
serves to provide confidence by constraining traders, enforcing
breaches, and lowering transaction costs. However, when the
machinery of law is not formally present, private arrangements often
emerge to mitigate conflict and support cooperation. One finds
examples of efficient private enforcement institutions throughout
history and within the context of international trade (Landa, 1981;
Bernstein, 1992; Grief, 1993; Stringham, 2003, 2004; Leeson, 2006). In
lieu of state enforcement, private arrangements rely on alternative
mechanisms to sustain cooperation.
                                                 
∗ The author wishes to thank Peter Boettke, Peter Leeson, Fred Sautet, Virgil Storr,
and seminar participants at George Mason University and the Mercatus Center for
helpful comments. This paper also benefited from the suggestions of two
anonymous referees.  The usual disclaimer applies.
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Remittance networks provide a window into functional
operations of self-enforcement. When a migrant worker residing in
Saudi Arabia remits a portion of his earnings to his family in a remote
Indian village, commonly he chooses the informal, illegal hawala
network to do so. From the migrant worker’s perspective, hawala will
transfer funds at much lower cost than formal mechanisms.
Hawala is a set of money transfer networks in operation since
ancient times, having emerged in the context where formal
enforcement of internal transactions by rulers and governments was
non-existent. As international trade began to emerge in South Asia in
the 11th century, hawala networks soon became important to
facilitating exchange. Moreover, these networks continue to operate
today, as they did in the past, relying on reputation mechanisms and
signaling to sustain coordination despite their illegality in most
countries.
The literature on self-enforcing exchange relationships focuses
predominantly on sustainable transactions between a relatively small
number of traders in periodic face-to-face exchange (Landa, 1981;
North, 1990; Bernstein, 1992; Grief, 1993; Stringham, 2003, 2004).
Among small groups of people, word travels fast. Reputations
develop, and because of the low cost of communication among the
group, all others in the group can use knowledge of past performance
to punish a cheat. In this manner, ex post multilateral punishment
mechanisms – such as ostracism – work well to ensure cooperation.
As long as myopic individuals do not populate the group, defection is
limited by the ability to detect and punish.
While Greif (1989, 1993) shows that reputation mechanisms
functioned efficiently in earlier periods among similar peoples, the
results of this line of research suggest that these mechanisms may
only be effective in particular settings with particular groups (i.e.,
several dozen Maghribi traders). To reinforce this view, Milgrom,
North and Wiengast (1990) attribute the transition from “simple”
reputation mechanisms to third party enforcement to the increasing
costs of keeping everyone informed: a requisite condition for
reputation mechanisms to operate. It is possible that these costs may
be systematically lower under particular conditions, under which the
particulars of time and place would determine the extent to which
reputation mechanisms could sustain trade. At some point, however,
self-enforcing exchange among large groups breaks down as the costs
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of communication in large numbers become prohibitively high
(Greif, 1989, 2002; Landa, 1994; Zerbe and Anderson, 2001).
North states that "realizing the economic potential of the gains
from trade in a high technology world of enormous specialization
and division of labor characterized by impersonal exchange is
extremely rare, because one does not necessarily have repeated
dealings, nor know the other party, nor deal with a small number of
other people” (1990). Thus, while breakdown must occur at some
level, it is premature to dismiss self-enforcing mechanisms as simple
and operative only among small, localized groups.  Notably, research
by Ferson and Laitin (1996) and Leeson (2006) suggests that self-
enforcing exchange can be effective across larger populations and
greater distances, and Stringham (2005) considers environments as
indeterminate as the Internet. The size and scope of self-enforcing
networks of exchange merits further investigation.
Following Ferson and Laitin (1996), this paper considers ex ante
and ex post mechanisms that create the foundations of extra-legal, yet
peaceful, frequent exchange across great geographic distance. The
compelling theory of ethnically homogeneous middleman groups put
forth by Landa (1981, 1994) is shown herein to apply to exchange
relations of spanning greater geographic distances and scope than
previously considered.  Hawala networks function as self-enforcing
structures through ex post reputation mechanisms and ex ante
signaling mechanisms.  These serve as functional substitutes in niche
markets for formal contract enforcement mechanisms.
Serving individuals as far flung as New York and rural South
Asian villages, hawala transactions encompass a multitude of diverse
traders and cross countless borders. This system of self-enforcement
fills a very narrow but important gap in the formal market for
remittance transfer services. While this does not necessarily mean
that these self-enforcing exchange relationships and mechanisms can
support all high volume trade, it does suggest that some types of
trade are sustainable in this manner. Hence, hawala networks raise
the question of the magnitude of trade, distance, and traders capable
of exchanging through mechanisms of reputation and signaling.1
                                                 
1 An extension of this research investigates exchange between heterogeneous
groups and the extent to which these networks incorporate ethnically diverse
traders.
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This paper extends the literature on private or informal contract
enforcement (Milgrom, North, and Weingast, 1990; Greif, 1989,
1993, 2002; Landa, 1994; Leeson, 2006; Stringham, 2003) by
examining the remarkable hawala money-transfer systems that
operate today between South Asia and the rest of the world. Section
II begins by giving an account of how hawala transfer networks work
and the extent of their operations. The important points here are the
market niche that these self-enforcing remittance networks serve, the
amount of trade flowing through these networks, and the geopolitical
borders these transactions cross. The third section analyzes the ex
post reputation mechanisms that sustain cooperation within the core
of the network. Section IV examines the ex ante signaling devices
used in reassuring peripheral clients. The fifth section concludes.
II.  The Hawala Networks
Hawala is a Middle Eastern and South Asian informal system of
transferring money across long distances and borders. Similar
networks have and do exist in many other parts of the world and
throughout history (such as the fei-ch’ien in China and al barakat in
Somalia).2 These practices represent long-standing Islamic traditions
developed in various forms across the regions of the Middle East and
South Asia.  Emerging in ancient times, hawala networks continued
to operate throughout the medieval and colonial eras, and are still
widely in use today (Ballard, 2005; Passas, 2006; Schramm and Taube,
2003; Wilson, 2002; Ismail, 2007).
Hawala first emerged to facilitate trade across geographical,
political and cultural borders in a context of weak, absent or
conflicting formal institutions. In many cases, individuals chose the
informal services as a direct result of generally poor provision of
additional banking services by the state (Subramanian, 1987).3 Hawala
                                                 
2 “Hawala” and “hundi” are sometimes used interchangeably – such as in parts of
South Asia – but should be distinguished. Hundi was a bill of exchange, negotiable
without endorsement, that also functioned as a remittance vehicle (Passas, 2006).
For an extensive treatment of the system in Somalia, see Ismail (2007).
3 For example, in mid-eighteenth century colonial India, “….the official Mughal
Mint authorities were expected to do the needful for all importers of bullion,
foreign and used coins free of charge, but the inevitable delay at the mints during
the peak season compelled them [the British] to take resort to local and informal
banking and exchange facilities offered by the Bania shroffs (sarraffs)”
(Subramanian, 1987, p.476). Also see Dasgupta (1979). For a general description of
shroffs and their functions in Mughal India, see Habib (1960, 1973, p.290-303).
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operates by transferring funds through clearing systems that
minimize the costly shipment of coin and bullion.4 Over time, these
needs led to the development of networks of lenders and
businessmen that could transfer funds, often without physical
currency changing hands.
1. How Hawala Works
In essence, the hawala system is an extensive and fluid network
of individuals who facilitate the transfer of funds by exchanging
credits and debts.  A modern hawala transaction typically takes the
following form: Individual (A), working in New York, wants to send
remittances back to his family (B) in rural India. (A) contacts a local
hawaladar (Ha). (Ha) arranges to take (A)’s dollars and a service fee.
In Figure 1, the dashed line represents this exchange. In return, (Ha)
gives (A) a code to pass on to (B) for identification upon delivery. (A)
could phone his relatives and inform them of the upcoming transfer,
or as in the past, pre-established dates, times, and amounts are often
arranged by mail or word of mouth. (Ha) would then contact his
business partner in India (Hb), providing him with the code and
corresponding amount to be paid. Figure 1 shows this dotted line of
communication. (Hb) then pays (B), who identifies himself by the
code, the stipulated amount in rupees. The identification code could
indicate family lineage or is often a passage from the Qur’an.
Again, the dashed line in Figure 1 represents the flow of money.
For (A) and (B), the transaction is complete. However, (Ha) and (Hb)
have an outstanding debt and claim, respectively. These two
individuals may settle their obligations either through additional
(reverse) transactions, or balancing at a later date. Often hawaladars
with established relations will determine particular monthly dates for
settling debts and credits.  In many cases these settlements will occur
in tandem with additional business practices, taking the form of
misinvoicing goods. In other situations, as discussed below, the
structure of the market determines the repayment schedule. The solid
                                                 
4 As an excerpt from a letter to the Court of Directors in 1636 by an Englishman in
Surat demonstrates, “[c]oncerning the coining of your gold and silver into the
species of this country, it is free for us though not safe. We should have to do with
such dangerous people in the mint that we dare not adventure, nor will the most
cunning merchants of these parts upon any occasion, but sell all to shroffs to
whom it is most proper”  (qtd. in Gokhale, 1971, p.110).
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line in Figure 1 between the two hawaladars represents these
practices.5
Figure 1: Hawala network structure.
Whether this system is used to pay debts, send remittances, or
mobilize finances for consumption or investment purposes, the
fundamental structure of the system remains the same. Although the
                                                 
5 See Schramm and Taube (2003) and El Qorchi et al. (2003).  All authors describe
the same basic modern funds transfer process with regards to different examples of
hawala networks.
Flow of Currency:
Flow of Information:
Exchange of Debits and Credits:
A B
Geographical Distance
Ha Hb
Hawala Network
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description given above is over-simplified, it identifies the two
relationships of primary importance to understanding how this
system operates. The points of overlap among different networks are
the primary shortcomings of this diagram. It is possible that when
(Ha) is sending money to rural India, the money is exchanged several
times among additional hawaladars before reaching the final
destination. (Ha) may not have a direct trading partner in the
particular village, for example, and thus must first go through an
additional hawaladar in Bombay. In the following sections, I further
discuss examples of more detailed network relations.
2. Why Not Western Union?
It is important to note that hawala systems do not differ
significantly in the services they perform from those services offered by
the formal banking sector or transfer services such as Western Union
or Money Gram (Wilson, 2002).  An example of the formal banking
sector providing similar money-transfer services is the Citibank NRI
account, which offers free transfers from the United States to a
relative's account in India.  The distinctive feature of hawala is its
operation outside the scope of, and without recourse to, formal legal
or government enforcement.6
Sending money through a hawala network can be a preferred
means of transfer when compared to the formal system for several
reasons. Migrant workers sending remittances to their families in
their home country use hawala the most. Many times the hawala
system is a relatively less expensive means of moving money.
Individuals using these services are sending small amounts of money,
usually less than $200 (El Qorchi, 2003).  Formal institutions typically
charge flat fees of $10 to $15 per transfer. Thus, when amount of the
transfer is low, on average the formal institutions charge a higher
percentage of the total. The International Monetary Fund estimates
the cost of hawala transactions to be between 2 and 5 percent (El
Qorchi, 2003, p.16), while these same transactions in the formal
sector can range from 10 to 20 percent (Ballard, 2005).
Furthermore, hawala transactions are typically complete within
one to two days, often much faster than many formal means of
                                                 
6 “In the absence of any functioning state administration, the integrity of every
agreement is ensured by the personal relationships existing between the two
counterparts, and depends on trust as a last resort” (Monsutti, 2004, p.224).
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accomplishing the same goal (Ballard, 2005; El Qorchi, 2003). This is
the case when transfers are going to more remote areas where formal
banks and Western Union offices do not operate. A more favorable
exchange rate is also part of the lower price of the service, providing
additional benefits over formal mechanisms. In the extreme case, in a
location where no formal banking system exists, such as Afghanistan,
hawala networks serve as the primary means of money transfer
(Monsutti, 2004).7
Finally, hawala transactions are an attractive option in many cases
because they provide a means of avoiding currency controls and
bureaucratic red tape, as well as typically offer exchange rates more
favorable than those offered by formal banks. Especially in countries
with fixed or managed exchange rates, the rates offered by
hawaladars are a better reflection of market conditions. In addition,
in some circumstances undocumented workers are barred from using
formal banks or transfer services by country-specific banking
regulations. These regulations provide significant incentives to send
money through informal systems, especially when the amount of the
transfer is low.
3. Size and Scope
Increasing globalization and population migration can easily lead
one to underestimate the role that informal, self-enforcing
arrangements serve in facilitating exchange in the modern context of
contract uncertainty of developing countries. Because these
operations are illegal, formal data sources, such as balance of
payments statistics, do not capture the volume of transactions that
take place. Gaining perspective on the size and scope of hawala
networks therefore must make use of alternative estimates.
Researchers at the Internal Monetary Fund conducted one study
of the international size and scope of hawala. Recognizing the
inherent difficulties of measuring networks and the volume of
transactions conducted outside the legal sphere, this study attempts a
                                                 
7 “[I]t is difficult to determine which amount is remitted every year Afghanistan
through unofficial channels. For instance, when migrants and refugees in Iran wish
to send their savings back to their families in Afghanistan, they cannot use the
formal banking system since it is unlikely that have identification papers; in any
case, banks are no longer operating in Afghanistan. They therefore entrust their
money to a businessman specializing in remittances known locally as a hawaladar.”
(Monsutti, 2004, p.220).
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raw estimate of the volume of remittance flows. El Qorchi et al.
(2003) construct a simulated model based on the available statistics
on private (legal) transfers8 and available data from 1981–2000 on
parallel exchange rates in the illegal markets in 15 countries with
operative hawala networks.9 This model estimated that $10 to $35
billion was transferred through hawala per annum over the last 20
years (El Qorchi, 2003).
Separate studies corroborate these results. Abella (1989) as well as
Alburo and Abella (1992) guess that hawala transactions in “Pakistan,
the Philippines, Sudan and Egypt…could represent double or triple
the amount of official remittance figures.” Gilani et al. (1981)
estimates that 48 per cent of Pakistani migrants transfer unrecorded
remittances via the hawala system. As an anthropologist, Alessandro
Monsutti reports of Afghanistan, “In September 1995, an important
Hazara trader told me that 600 million afghanis (about $140,000 at
the time on the black market) were sent every day from Quetta to the
district of Jaghori alone” (2004, p.220).
Another means to gauging the amount of money flowing through
hawala networks is to look at the value of goods misinvoiced in
international exports. Misinvoicing is one of the primary ways
hawaladars clear outstanding debts among each other. From
1970–1979, misinvoicing made up 30.7 percent of the value of total
exports in the Middle East and Turkey (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).
In the 1980s and 1990s, misinvoicing accounted for 16.7% and
17.4% of the value of total exports, respectively (Reinhart and
Rogoff, 2004). Other estimates concerning Somali hawala place the
figure between $750 million and $1 billion US annually (Omar,
2003).10
                                                 
8 Data for this portion of the study is drawn from the International Monetary
Fund, Balance of Payment Statistics Yearbook 2003.
9 This data was collected by the IMF and matched to data used in Reinhart and
Rogoff (2002), “The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A
Reinterpretation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1): 1–48.
10 This estimate includes hawala firms that have formalized their network
operations in Somalia, and would be upward biased as a representative account due
to the fact that hawala has served as the primary mechanism for moving money
into the war-torn failed state.
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4. Hawala: Not Just a Family Affair
Discussions of hawala networks tend to underestimate the size
and scope of such systems. By focusing on the fact that they flourish
in historically tribal societies, past research has not appreciated the
ability for these networks to integrate large numbers of foreign
traders.
From firsthand accounts of contemporary hawala networks
operating in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, Monsutti (2004)
characterizes the four types of actors within the system. The first are
close relatives, to which he identifies feelings of solidarity arising
among individuals connected through the mother’s side of the family.
Familial relationships stemming from the father’s side tend to be
characterized by direct competition and conflict. Second are distant
relatives and friends. These groups are the people of choice for
engaging in business partnerships and lending activities. The third
type is people from the same locality, ethnic or social group who
“may be linked by the hawala system but may not be engaged in a
close economic partnership” (Monsutti, 2004, p.224). Fourth, and
most importantly, transfers of funds involve people from the host
society, and those outside of the familiar circles of ethnicity or social
background. “Without the intervention of the latter [outsiders], each
social network would be an inefficient, isolated structure” (Monsutti,
2004, p.225).11 Furthermore, from the recent qualitative study of
hawala networks Passas (2006) indicates that high-level settlements
among hawaladars may cross ethnic boundaries.
From accounts such as this, it becomes clear that hawala
networks stretch far beyond family ties. To understand the
complexity and diversity of modern hawala transactions, consider the
following account given by anthropologist Robert Ballard (2005,
p.332):
Ha in Birmingham has taken orders for the delivery of Rs10m
in Mirpur, for which he has received £75,000 from his UK-
based customers. Meanwhile Hc in Karachi has a customer
                                                 
11 Outsider use and participation in these networks is not a recent development.
Drawing on historical accounts of these networks in operation in the mid-
seventeenth century, “... [t]he expansion of Gujarat's overseas trade…had resulted
in the emergence of widely integrated Hundi network enabling merchant,
administrator, soldier or even tourist to utilize it whenever necessary”
(Subramanian, 1987, p.479)
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who wished to purchase $100,000 in order to settle the
invoice for a consignment of televisions which he has
imported from China, whose manufacturer is expecting
payment to be made into his US dollar account in Hong
Kong. Ha and Hc separately approach a specialist settlement
broker in Dubai, Hd, who calculates (for the sake of
argument) that Rs10m = US$100,000 = £75,000, so
generating an ideal opportunity to arrange a back-to-back
swap. Hence Hd sets up a hawala settlement in which Ha
buys $100,000 on the London money market through his
bank which he promptly sends by [electronic transfer] to Hd’s
account with the Bank of America in New York; meanwhile
Hc takes delivery of Rs10m in cash from his television
importing customer, which he promptly dispatches by road to
Hb in Mirpur, thereby recompensing Hb for the
disbursements made in response to Ha’s previously faxed
instructions; and to close the whole deal, Hd transfers
$100,000 by Swift…from his account in New York to the
television manufacturer’s account in Hong Kong.
Hawala networks support large amounts of trade across borders
and among many traders. Different means of establishing and
conveying reputation will be involved at various stages in a hawala
transaction. In particular, the mechanisms that secure cooperation in
core transactions are distinctive from the mechanisms that do the
same in peripheral transactions.
III.  Network Reputation Mechanisms
Exchanges between hawaladars constitute the core of the
network, and can be viewed as a group to enforce transactions that
take place among themselves. The members of the core club are able
to secure benefits by sharing the costs of enforcement. What binds
these members together to produce the level of cohesiveness capable
of enforcing exchanges absent an impartial third party? Four
mechanisms bind exchange: shared belief systems, repeated dealings,
interconnectedness of additional business practices, and the structure
of debts and credits.
Hawaladars typically share common religious beliefs, providing a
basis for mutual understanding of values. As Kuran explains,
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The Islamic subeconomy enables these newcomers to
establish business relationships with a diverse pool of
ambitious, hard-working, but culturally handicapped people,
who like themselves, are excluded from the economic
mainstream.  Their shared commitment to Islam, even if
partly feigned, keeps many of their activities within social
circles in which information about dishonest behavior
spreads quickly, thus providing a basis for mutual trust (1995,
p.169).
Even for hawaladars who are not particularly devout, self-
identification with a religion can serve as a credible basis of trust.
Exchanging among those who are culturally similar to you lowers
the transactions costs relative to exchange with outsiders by relying
on a common understanding concerning the terms of trade. In other
words, exchanging with those who are similar to you reduces the
uncertainty as to what constitutes cheating. This lowers the total cost
of enforcement by relying on already established norms of
contractual obligation.
A shared religious affiliation, however, cannot be called upon to
do all the heavy lifting required to explain the maintenance of
hawala.12 Repeated dealings amongst one another embed one shot
transactions into an ongoing game in which hawaladars deal with
multiple other hawaladars both simultaneously and sequentially. As
Milgrom et al. (1990) argue, even if particular pairs of traders do not
exchange regularly, if each trader trades regularly within the
community of traders, then “transferable reputations” for honesty
can serve as adequate bonds. Honest dealings are rewarded with
ongoing participation in low cost transactions and generate a stream
or revenue for the trustworthy participant. The better one's
reputation, the less often will others refuse to do business.
Membership in the trading network brings with it an identity and
reputation among others within the core. Investments made to
establish and maintain trustworthiness and credibility are seen as
specific investments in social capital (Schramm and Taube, 2003;
Williamson, 1985). These investments only secure returns so long as
                                                 
12 Schramm and Taube make the unfounded generalization that “The tie to a
religious system of the radical nature described (and assumed) here is much the
same as a high, specific investment that prevents (social) transactions with other
religious or social groups from ever taking place” (2003, p.412).
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the member remains within the network. In other words, ostracism
from the club entails a forfeiture of remunerative social capital.
Schramm and Taube (2003) believe that the religious nature of
hawala networks limits the diversification hawaldars can achieve.
They identify the choice of religion as final and irreversible; thus, the
construction of the social bond over religion is exclusive. Consistent
with the outcome described by Schramm and Taube (2003), the limits
to diversification in transaction potential derive in part from the
interconnectedness of economic activities among hawaladars.
For individuals in the network, moving money is not their only
occupation. For most, it is not even their primary occupation.
Hawaladars who provide these services today typically also run small
merchandise shops or import/export operations.13 This is similar to
historical accounts of the evolution of hawala (Torri, 1991).14
Clearing debts between hawaladars often occurs through the
operations of these other business practices. For example, Ha sends a
message to Hb requesting that he pay out remittances to Ha’s clients.
Ha and Hb are also trading partners in the import/export of
garments. Ha, at a later date, would then ship Hb his ordered goods,
billing him for the value of the goods less his outstanding debt for
the hawala transfer.
The interconnectedness of hawala and traditional business
practices strengthens the informal network ties between hawaladars.
If a member of the network fails to uphold a hawala transaction,
ostracism from future hawala transactions is an ex post multilateral
punishment mechanism. Ostracism in this case operates in a similar
fashion as described by Bernstein (1992) and Stringham (2002).
Due to the tied nature of these transactions, additional unilateral
punishment by the cheated party is also possible. Cheating a member
                                                 
13 “Many economic and trading activities are based on the hawala system. All of the
shops of Hazarajat, from Yakalang to Behsud, from Panjab to Jaghori operate on
this system…” (Monsutti, 2004, p.221).
14 According to the Records of John Griffith, the incumbent Chief of the Board of
Surat in 1790, “the natives here [in Surat] called shroffs were originally dealers in
raw silk and piece goods.” He goes on to describe that “…as a ship of small
burthen could bring in these rich articles [piece goods and raw silk] to the value of
two or three lacs and carry back only a tenth part of the proceeds in cotton, the
only article of return, the merchants had no alternative left them of remitting the
overplus but in bills of exchange. This induced them to take up the profession of
shroffs, being so intimately connected with that of silk merchants” (Torri, 1991,
p.373).
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of the group is accompanied by general distrust and consequently a
termination from profitable business relationships in other industries.
In short, subjecting themselves to a broader range of economic
sanctions (termination of import/export enterprises and funds
transfer activities) creates a costly, credible signal of trustworthiness.
In hawala networks, the structure of exchange functions heavily
to constrain opportunist behavior among traders in the network,
while reinforcing honest dealing and cooperation. At any given time,
one hawaladar has outstanding debts or credits with a number of
other hawaladars. Simultaneously being in debt to one hawaladar and
holding credits of another restricts the ability to cheat any one
member. The repeated exchange between any two hawaladars is
embedded into a system of simultaneous exchanges among others. If
Ha is in debt to Hb, but has yet to clear credits he has accrued with
Hc, he cannot fail to honor his obligation to Hb without that
information traveling to Hc. In other words, the staggering of
clearing debts among hawaladars lowers the probability of defection
of any one member within the group.
What keeps one broker from accumulating debts with a great
number of others and exiting the system? The structure of the
informal remittance markets provides the key. Parallel markets in
currency exist between the cities and the rural areas. The demand for
foreign currency is strong in the cities and weak in rural areas. In
rural areas, where the majority of remittances are sent, the demand is
for local currency. The incentives of hawaladars in urban and rural
areas are beneficially aligned to execute ongoing reciprocal exchange.
These incentives, coupled with staggered timing of clearing debts and
credits among network hawaladars, reinforce cooperative exchange.
These four factors: shared belief systems, social capital attached
to hawala membership, the nature of repeated exchanges, and the
interconnectedness of additional business practices, together make up
the bond a defector would sacrifice if he chose to cheat any other
member in the network. The structure of clearing debts and credits
among hawaladars reduces the ability for agents to cheat and
simultaneously provides an information transmission mechanism for
communicating the past behaviors of other hawaladars.
1. Communicating reputation
The system ensures cooperation by transmitting information
concerning other hawaladars. Transferable reputations succeed only
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to the extent that other traders within the network can be kept
informed of each other’s past behaviors. Milgrom et al. (1990)
identify the problem that reputation mechanisms overcome as the
costliness of generating and communicating information rather than
as the infrequency of trade between any particular pair of traders.
Ongoing exchanges among hawaladars operate both sequentially
and simultaneously. As any one member is concurrently in positions
of debit and credit, each member has multiple avenues and
opportunities to communicate the past behaviors of others in the
network. The costs of transmitting the relevant knowledge remain
low because the total amount of information concerning past
behavior required to sustain cooperative trades is limited.
Each individual hawaladar has the incentive to report accurately
the reputation of those with whom he exchanges. If (Ha) were to
make false accusations concerning (Hb), and information flows are
uninterrupted, then other hawaladars would uncover that (Hb) was in
fact honest. It is in the interest of each hawaladar to provide
information to others in the network, thereby making their
relationship more valuable. The repercussions of the lies then fall on
(Ha). Because all agents within the network are aware of this,
backward induction prevents most false accusations from emerging
in the first place. The relative scarcity of false accusations also makes
it easier to detect false information when it arises.
 If a breach were to occur, the hawaladar unilaterally punishes the
defector by terminating future trades and reports the defection to
others with whom he exchanges. This is directly beneficial for the
cheated hawaladar in that ostracism strengthens the certainty of
future exchanges within the network. Accurate reporting also works
to bolster his honest reputation among other honest hawaladars.
False communication of defection is unlikely. Any such instance
would suffer the same punishments as actual defection, without the
immediate monetary gain.
The existence and persistence of these networks over the past
thousand years raises the question of how information about
hawaladars’ reputations and the reputations of their clients could be
transmitted effectively even when communication was slow and
costly. Currently, the majority of this communication occurs though
modern technology, leaving no paper trail in the wake of transactions
(Ballard, 2002; El Qorchi et al., 2003; Passas, 2006; Wilson, 2002).
Thus, it is illustrative to briefly cover how reputation was
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communicated in the past as an insight into how hawaladars
communicate today.
The hundi was the primary mechanism used in hawala networks
to transmit information regarding hawaladars and clients’ honesty in
the absence of modern technology. Hundis were in essence bills of
exchange, and different types of hundis reflected the corresponding
reputation associated with the transacting parties.15
Generally speaking, there where two broad categories of hundis,
each containing eight different types – the “hamare gharu hundis” and
“tumahre gharu hundis.” Hawaladars issuing “hamare gharu hundis” on
their own behalf were responsible for all losses or gains on these
transactions. In “tumahre gharu hundis,” on the other hand, the charges
will be borne by the opposite hawaladar, and the entries will be
reversed “in the books” of the previous hawaladar.
From these two general categories, one comes to understand that
ways existed to effectively communicate the relevant information for
the transaction. The general category of hundi used to remit funds
indicated the individual reputation at stake for a given transaction. If
“hamare gharu hundis” were used, the hawaladar asking the other to pay
out funds was vouching for his clients’ credibility – and assuming
profits or losses from the transaction. If “tumahre gharu hundis” were
sent, the hawaladar doing the sending was essentially stating that the
other must assume the responsibility for the transaction.
Within these general categories, more subtle distinctions emerge;
these are modernly communicated without the use of physical media.
Various terminology used in the exchange process indicate to whom
the property right applies. With the advent of the telegraph, the
phone, the fax machine, the cellular phone, and eventually the
Internet – the cost of communicating the reputation of others in the
network has declined dramatically.
                                                 
15 There were two general kinds of hundi: Darshani and Mudati.  The Darshani were
payable on presentation and the Mudati were payable after a stipulated period of
time or given date.  Both kinds of hundis are then classified into various types
according to negotiability and type of payee. From Indigenous Banking in Ancient and
Medieval India by Brijkishore Bhargava Bombay, 1934 D.B Taraporevala Sons & Co.
Treasure House of Books. Pgs. 179 - 180
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IV.  Peripheral Mechanisms
The analysis to now has distinguished reputation mechanisms as
the way in which coordination and peaceful exchange is achieved
among hawaladars. These results, extending the findings of Greif
(1989; 1993; 2006) and Milgrom et al. (1990), however, require an
additional mechanism to explain how coordination can be maintained
among larger numbers than they studied.  
As established earlier, the peripheral transactions in hawala
networks involve outsiders. In colonial India, these outsiders were
European soldiers, merchants, and travelers. In the modern context,
migrant workers sending remittances are the primary clientele of the
hawaladars. The transactions between the principals and the
hawaladars are the peripheral transactions of the network, and stretch
the network into a large group setting.
For reputation mechanisms to secure cooperation among large
numbers of people, communication must not become prohibitively
costly. Ex ante signaling mechanisms are necessary to elicit customers
and credibly establish trustworthiness; however, these signals must be
costly enough to send that they remain informative and do not
degenerate into cheap talk. How do hawaladars balance these
necessary costs to their advantage of gaining the peripheral
transactions?
As discussed above, hawaladars typically operate small
merchandise shops, travel agencies, or import/export operations.
These businesses require initial fixed costs – costs significant enough
to indicate commitment to the community and credibly signal that
the hawaladar has a sufficiently low discount rate not to cheat. These
costs are assumed under the ‘legitimate’ business plan and accounted
for as such. The creation of a credible ex ante signal of
trustworthiness through the operation of a business or shop becomes
marginally a low cost means of communicating reputation in
peripheral hawala transactions. These costs are perceived by
customers of hawaladars as credible signals, but are sunk costs in
terms of (previously borne) additional business practices. In this way,
the necessary costs of creating the credible signal ex ante are
incurred, but the marginal cost of then serving as a valuable signaling
mechanism to customers seeking hawala services is low.
Ex ante adoption of particular signaling mechanisms function to
underscore the margins on which pairs establish trustworthiness. By
investing in a costly signal, a member of the community can identify
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himself ex ante as a likely trading partner to others (Iannaconne,
1992). Signaling acceptance of cultural practices and similar status
through similarly adopted norms can establish similarities between
traders, thus forming the basis of mutual trust (Rafaeli and Pratt,
1993).
These signaling mechanisms, coupled with the competitive
pressures facing hawaladars, impose discipline among traders and
potential trading partners. Low cost mechanisms indicating a
requisite level of trustworthiness allow hawaladars to extend services
to local clientele.
V.  Conclusion
These findings suggest that coordination and peaceful exchange
is achieved among hawaladars. These results extend the studies of
Grief (1989; 1993; 2006), Landa (1981; 1994), and Milgrom et al
(1990) to exchange among many traders covering the globe and
moving vast amounts of resources. The established trust and
communication necessary to punish cheaters restricts the amount of
defection within the network. Among the literature on hawala, a
general consensus (Ballard, 2002; El Qorchi et al, 2003; Monsutti,
2004; Passas, 2006; Rudner, 2002; Subramanian, 1987; Torri, 1991;
Wilson, 2002) found that “one is hard pressed to find a cheated
party” (Passas, 2006). Defection probably does occur, but it is the
surely the exception rather than the norm.
Examination of currently operating hawala networks reveals that
self-enforcing exchange is possible among groups who share only
particular margins of similarity. The hawala networks analyzed above
have evolved to effectively segment the transaction and extend the
network. Hawala networks incorporate the use of ex post reputation
mechanisms to support large volumes of trade among themselves,
and use ex ante signaling to credibly communicate reputation to
customers.
The core transactions of hawala networks operate on trust that is
established through shared norms and values as well as the
interconnectedness of economic relationships. These exchanges
enforce easily because the total amount of information that must
flow though the network is limited, and that which does require
transmission is communicated effectively in a relatively swift and low
cost manner. However, the core transactions of these networks are
profitable only to the extent that they attract business from outsiders.
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Ex ante signaling of trustworthiness and shared values elicits
cooperation in peripheral transactions.
When formal mechanisms for enforcing property rights are non-
existent or prohibitively costly, self-enforcing means of overcoming
the coordination problem arise to meet the needs of individuals
seeking mutually beneficial exchange. Remittance systems of
exchange highlight how self-enforcing arrangements are prevalent in
areas where contract uncertainty exists.
Economic growth entails a movement from personal to
impersonal exchange. This paper shows that reputation and signaling
mechanisms for securing gains from trade have a broader scope than
previously recognized, and suggests international exchange as a
particularly fruitful extension of this literature. The persistence and
maintenance of these types of institutional structures exists in
contexts where government acts as a predator on market activities,
and effective formal enforcement of private property arrangements is
weak or absent.
Hawala networks arise as substitute institutions for highly
regulated, corrupt, unenforceable, or nonexistent formal systems.
These networks also persist when the costs of using formal systems
are prohibitive. The robust structure of relationships that binds this
system together is important in its own right to understanding how
cooperation is achieved absent a credible third party enforcer. Hawala
serves an important market gap in the formal system, enabling those
for whom sending remittances would have been marginally cost
prohibitive to do so. These market gaps are crucial in places such as
Somalia today, where they act as the only channels for foreign capital
to reach the people.
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